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Looking at the Overlooked: Portraits of Law
School Deans
PETER GOODRICHt
plus est quam quod videatur imago'
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. law school is awash with images. Every day in
the mail-electronic, internal, snail, podcast, or CCTV-
new glossy materials arrive, today's images: posters, flyers,
publicity brochures, fancy postcards and announcements as
well as magazines of the highest technical caliber and
printed on the most expensive materials, designed to the
nth degree. Every faculty member receives photo-portraits
of new hires, distinguished visitors, public lecturers, lateral
hirings, and celebrations of decanal appointments at their
own school and at most others. The law review will typically
publish an image and brief commentaries upon the death of
a senior faculty member. Add the internet to this, the
designs of Webmasters, Angels, and all the other
omnipresent advertisers. We are witness to an exponential
augmentation of digitized imagery and a whole new domain
of circulation of portraits, the virtual equivalent of
Baudrillard's degree Xerox of culture.
Remaining with theorists whose surname begins with
the letter 'B', Baudrillard's notion that endless duplication
renders the tangible irreal is a variation upon Walter
Benjamin's famous hypothesis that mechanical
reproduction steals the aura or soul of the work of art. The
image is flattened out, the portrait takes on the role of a
t Professor of Law, and Director, Law and Humanities, Cardozo Law School,
New York. Thanks to Duncan Kennedy, David Garland, Marty Slaugher, and
especially to David Walliker for interesting discussions of portraits and
portraiture. Thanks to Monroe Price as well for his general level of
effervescence.
1. Ovid: Heroides 13:149 [the image is more than it seems].
833
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
token in an economy of simulations, the institution becomes
a virtuality. The evil demon of images translates into the
fact that there is no demon, no referent, nothing left to
hide. 2 Just pure surface, endless faces, pulse code on a hard
drive. According to this perspective, the increase in the
quantity and availability of images-the visual saturation
of institutional space with representations-actually
devalues the visual and marginalizes images. The study of
the aesthetic of the law school would in this view be a
species of rhyparography, an accounting of the trivial or
more literally the scrutiny of institutional detritus. 3 It can
certainly seem like that; most of the circulars and emails
are rapidly thrown out, trashed, deleted, or passed over.
Lawyers, at least since the Reformation, have been hesitant
to take images as anything other than secondary and
potentially misleading resources. From the Romans on, it is
the text that is to be trusted-de fide instrumentorum was
the maxim-whereas images and indeed, rhetorical figures,
confuse and seduce. 4
It is undeniable that lawyers are ambivalent towards
images and the need to control the boundary between licit
and illicit images, icons and idols, good and bad objects of
affect, reliable and false similitudes, plays a huge though
not always explicit role in the development of legal order.
Whatever else may be implied or evidenced by the history of
juristic resistance to images, it attests at the very least to
the rhetorical power and the potential danger of the image.
I argue that the proliferation of visual media and non-text
based representations does not signal the insignificance of
images, but rather the opposite-the reproduction of the
symbolic order in new and ever more powerful, or at least
intrusive, forms. The internet offers, among other things, a
resurgence both of rhyparographs and their opposite,
megalographs, or depictions of proper forms as heralded by
2. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE EVIL DEMON OF IMAGES (1990); WALTER
BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans. 1986).
3. On the usages of rhyparography and megalography, see NORMAN BRYSON,
LOOKING AT THE OVERLOOKED: FOUR ESSAYS ON STILL LIFE PAINTING (1990).
4. I trace the early history of this explicit if disingenuous hostility to images
in PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: HISTORY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, LAW (1995). The
philosophical roots of this ambivalence are analyzed in JEAN-LUc NANCY, THE
GROUND OF THE IMAGE (Jeff Fort trans., 2005).
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the greats. The new media allow novel inscriptions of the
symbolic hierarchy and facilitate ever more immediate and
forceful dissemination of the order of law. Attention to the
genre of the portrait suggests that, as Ovid long ago
observed, the image is always more complex and loaded
than it seems. It gets under the skin, it captures the
subject, and, in that vein, it merits serious attention. 5
The exponential rise in the number of images
circulating in the law school should not detract attention
from the inherited forms and political genres that such
imagery adopts. It takes its place in a hierarchy of
representations and joins in the chorus of carefully
choreographed visual demarcations of the institutions of
law. For reasons of space and because the deadline for this
contribution is upon me rather sooner than I had
anticipated, I will use the example of portraits of deans and
related authority figures in law schools. I will look
specifically at a local example-that of my own law school-
but I will hint at a larger study that I am conducting
nationally, in the fullness of time. The principles are
comparable and the historical argument is similar. The
identity of the law school and the model of subject that it
inculcates gains one of its most forceful and liminal of
representations in the little examined and generally
unremarked genre of portraits that line the walls, overhang
the library, and stare down upon the students in the lecture
theaters.
I. LOOKING AT THE OVERLOOKED
The late great Dean Eugene Rostow of Yale Law School
apparently believed that deans had no power. To illustrate
this he "was fond of saying that, as dean, the only things he
could decide were the placement of portraits and the gender
designation of lavatories-and that, even as to these, it was
not all that clear."6 Others may wish to comment on gender,
5. For detailed accounts of the impress of images, see PIERRE LEGENDRE,
DIEU AU MIROIR: ETUDES SUR L'INSTITUTION DES IMAGES (1994); REGIS DEBRAY,
VIE ET MORT DE L'IMAGE (1992). For an analysis on the portrait image, see JEAN-
Luc NANCY, LE REGARD DU PORTRAIT (2000). One digression on that book can be
found in Peter Goodrich, Face Off: The Ironic, the Irenic and the Face Between,
16 LAw & CRITIQUE 357, 357-60 (2005).
6. Guido Calabresi, The Generosity of a Dean, 113 YALE. L.J. 5 (2003).
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toilets, and toiletry in relation to law, but for the purposes
of the present paper, it is the seeming dismissal of
placement and portraiture that merits discussion. On one
reading, the semantic placement of portraiture in the
immediate context of toilets reinforces the sense of these
paintings being the work of the rhyporagraph or
expressions of mural detritus. Rostow was right, of course,
in the sense that neither aesthetics nor semiotics are much
used terms in legal scholarship. The purchase and
placement of paintings, or sitting for portraits, are not
practices that gain any significant attention in the annals of
law school or the discourse of the legal academy. It is at
best "a rather charming tradition," something wholly
incidental, an afterthought, a surprise. 7 And thus,
somewhat ironically in a legal system that prides itself
upon being 'common' law, the everyday-the visual
environment-is not generally deemed to be of much
normative significance. Those that overlook are overlooked.
Such inattention is a mistake. The visual spaces of the
legal academy are too important to be left unremarked. The
art and other plastic representations that reflect
institutional forms onto their current occupants are a key to
the affective and quotidian functions of subject formation, of
character and identity. The portraits of deans and other
famous jurists represent and disseminate a history, as well
as the proper forms of juridical role and aspiration. For the
student, and even if the perspective of the pupil is seldom
acknowledged, there can be little doubt that the serried
array of portraits that line the walls and mark the
pedagogic spaces of law schools are precisely
representations of the greats, the founders, the leaders, the
heroes and, more rarely, heroines of the tradition and of the
institution. The genre of juridical portraiture belongs to
megalography-it inscribes greatness, it disseminates the
immemorial, the tradition, and it shows that what
overlooks prescribes both what is now and what is to come.
The portraits are, in this sense, representations of ars iuris
or the art of law. They are the modern, or not so modern,
equivalent of emblems; the moralizing images through
which those who could not or did not care to read were
7. M.H. Hoeflich, Lawyers, Books & Papers, 5 THE GREEN BAG 2d 163 (2002).
836 [Vol. 54
THE OVERLOOKED
enabled to see their place and observe the authority placing
them there. 8
Walk into any law school and one encounters a wide
variety of plastic inscriptions and visual depictions of the
authority of law. There is interesting work on the
architecture of law, so I will simply observe that the law
school tends to be separate from the rest of the university;
it stands alone and somewhat larger than life.9 It is also a
prominent member of the written city, and so the first
image, aside from the columns, the grandeur or the
separateness of the building, comes in the manner of
chiseled or emblazoned words. Take Harvard Law School as
somewhat exemplary. The law school buildings are
separated by an arterial highway-a postmodern moat-
from the main campus. Approaching from the quad of the
main campus one first encounters Austin Hall, named of
course after John Austin himself. On the cornice of the
building is inscribed, for the edification of passing vehicles
presumably as well as law students, boldly capitalized, in
roman font: "And thou shalt teach them ordinances and law
and show them the way wherein they must walk and the
work they must do." Inside, in the Ames Courtroom, at the
back, glowering over the students in an unknown language,
is the Latin inscription Jurisprudentiae sacrum anno
domino MDCCCLXXXIII, or words to that effect.
Take Austin's friend Jeremy Bentham, reformer,
satirist, and scourge of Latinities. (See figure 1.) If you
enter the law library at University College London you can
still see him stuffed and seated in a large case with a plate-
glass front, wearing his everyday clothes and with his stick
"Dapple" in hand.10 He left his body to science "not out of
8. The relevant legal maxim is pro lectione pictura est, or, the picture takes
the place of knowing how to read. Ironically, the opposite is now likely true: we
are far more likely to know how to read than we are to be competent in looking
at images.
9. On the analogous theory of the architecture of courts, see Piyel Haldar,
The Function of the Ornament in Quintilian, Alberti, and Court Architecture, in
LAW AND THE IMAGE 117 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999). See also
KATHERINE FISHER TAYLOR, IN THE THEATER OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PALAIS DE
JUSTICE IN SECOND EMPIRE FRANCE (1993).
10. Bentham was fond of giving his walking sticks names. For these and
other details of the Auto-Icon, see C.F.A. Marmoy, The 'Auto-Icon' of Jeremy
Bentham at University College, London, 2 MED. HIST. 77, 77-86 (1958).
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affectation of singularity, but to the intent and with the
desire that mankind may reap some small benefit in and by
my decease." Such protestation aside, it was still a way of
living on; a wax model was made of his head and it is the
wax model on display while his preserved head remains in
mummified state in a box close at hand. It is a strange
image, but it is precisely the exception that proves the rule.
The auto-icon is the most lively and lifelike of images of the
deceased. It proffers an exact depiction of the classical role
of the image-of the model, mask, or portrait of the
ancestor-in relation to the living.
Figure 1. Jeremy Bentham.
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Classicists and historicists make much of the
significance of the imago-the funerary mask of the
emperor or ancestor-and the corresponding power of the
image as the representation of both legitimacy and
authority." The auto-icon is the exemplary image, just as
the portrait, Pliny's imaginum pictura-picture of the
face-lies at the origin of painting.12 Both involve a
reliquary act, an impress, mold, or residue of the deceased.
The logic of such images is both generative and juristic: the
ancestor is present and their presence governs the
institution. It is a matter of what Legendre terms "symbolic
permutation": his theory is that the subject is born twice,
once biologically and a second time symbolically. The latter
birth takes the form of entry into language and thence into
the institution, of which law school is but a peculiarly
pronounced form.' 3 The same point is made in terms of the
role of the image as the modality of attachment in histories
of painting. The portrait is the imprint of the face, the
record of the past, the guarantee of what is to come. More
importantly, it functions as a site of attachment or
unconscious bonding.
The child's first love is pre-linguistic. The child gazes
up at the mother and attaches to the retinal imprint of her
face, an image which becomes so firmly inscribed that it is
recognized without thought.14 Such attachment to the
maternal image is primary and replicated, in some
measure, in the process of passage to institutional life. One
can fall in love with books, even with norms, and lawyers
11. For a history of the 'moulding image,' see GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN,
DEVANT LE TEMPS: HISTOIRE DE L'ART ET ANACHRONISME DES IMAGES (2000);
Georges Didi-Huberman, The Molding Image: Genealogy and the Truth of
Resemblance in Pliny's Natural History, Book 35, 1-7 (Peter Goodrich trans.), in
LAW AND THE IMAGE, supra note 9; Florence Dupont, Les Morts et la Mgmoire: La
Masque Fun~bre, in LA MORT LES MORTS ET L'AU-DELA: DANS LE MONDE ROMAIN
167 (1987).
12. See MAURIZO BETTINI, THE PORTRAIT OF THE LOVER (1999) for an account
of the original image and the birth of painting.
13. See Pierre Legendre, Hermes and Institutional Structures: An Essay on
Dogmatic Communication, in LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A LEGENDRE READER
(Peter Goodrich, ed., Peter Goodrich, with Alain Pottage & Anton Schiitz trans.,
1997). For the full theory of the institutional equivalent of the mirror phase, see
LEGENDRE, supra note 5.
14. RICHARD BRILLIANT, PORTRAITURE 9-10 (1991).
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frequently do, but these do not provide any visceral modes
of identification or visual emblems of character. Little
noticed, internally binding rather than externally grafted,
the portraits of deans and other greats actually mark two
key institutional functions. The first, as already discussed,
is that of legitimate authority. The parental function of the
institution, of the law school as a nursery of future lawyers,
is taken up in various didactic, pedagogic, and inductive
modes, but none more subtle and direct than the silent
emblems that hang forbiddingly on the walls. These
seeming archaisms, these apparently reliquary forms, mark
the variable ideal types of juridical being, the legal forms of
identity and the proper manifestations of character. This is
what I will term the megalographic function.
The second function of the portrait is obviously enough
symbolic. The paintings, like all art, are transitional
images. They mark a border or point of permutation. The
portrait knows something. It tells the history of a life. It
represents a persona, even if it is unrecognizable for its
likeness. The juristic use of portraits must by hypothesis
have a comparably pedagogic function. The legal academy
molds subjects, it institutes a new identity or professional
persona, and it is in this aspect that the portraits show
students-directly yet mutely-the image of what that
persona or mask of the jurist will be. Here, they seem to
represent the outside of law within the school of lawyers.
They mark the presence of the social within the academy,
the future reality of law, within the protected space of the
school. The portraits are witness to exemplary public lives,
to roles and virtues that mix the inside and the outside, the
social with the academic, the professional with the lived.
Here, in effect, are some exemplary instances of juridical
personality and of lawful life. These were great lives and
this is their megalography, the artistic representation of
their greatness.
II. TENTATIVE SKETCH OF THE GENRES OF JURIDICAL
PORTRAITURE
A. The Prophet
The modern lawyer's role, according to the American
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, is that of prophecy. The
840 [Vol. 54
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jurist's professional function is to prophesy what the courts
will do and so advise his 'friend the bad man' on the force or
fine that will be imposed upon him if he breaks the rules.15
Holmes's argument was aimed at the tendency of lawyers to
imagine a metaphysical source or invisible cause of legal
order. He was more pragmatically minded, and so wanted-
or at least at some level seemed to want-temporal images,
mundane and secular accounts of legal rules, specifically of
their application. There are various ironies to Holmes's
well-known thesis, not least the idea that one could escape
religion by making lawyers into prophets. Whatever the
various paradoxes of the Holmesian position, the lawyer as
prophet is the first type or archetype of decanal portrait. It
is also fittingly well captured in the broodingly omnipresent
and thoroughly portentous style used in the portrait of
Holmes that hangs in the lobby of one of the Harvard Law
School main buildings.
Holmes was at Harvard Law School until he was
appointed to the bench, and Harvard provides numerous
instances of emblematically prophetic figures of portraiture.
They line the faculty common spaces and have their
efflorescence in the Langdell Library. There are busts,
bronzes, antiquities, relics, and masterpieces hanging or
standing on pedestals throughout this modern musewn.
Take Langdell himself-Christopher Columbus Langdell, to
give him his full and fully foundational nomination. History
records him as the Harvard Law School dean who
transformed legal education from a parasitic trade school
vocational course to a science. He founded the modern
method of so-called Socratic legal teaching-the Oedipally
governed paper chase-in which the student is awed or
verbally beaten into his new persona or molding.
The prophet is an archetype, an eminence, a bearer of
the messages of the Gods. The portrait of the prophet
should seek to capture such archetypical traces. A bust or
sculpture is, in many ways, the best emblem of prophecy,
and Harvard certainly is replete with those. The biblical
significance of the figure who portends the news of the
future kingdom can be inscribed in the material of
15. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457-58 (1897).
For an extended commentary on the 'bad man,' see Peter Goodrich, Satirical
Legal Studies: From the Legists to the Lizard, 103 MICH. L. REV. 397 (2004).
2006] 841
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representation, in the purest alabaster: the white marble in
which the figure of Joseph Story is sculpted, closed book in
hand, at the entrance to the main building of Harvard Law
School. (See figure 2.)
Figure 2. Joseph Story.
It can take the form of the written building: the word
Langdell inscribed on the cornice of the Law School. Or, we
can find a portrait of the latter day discoverer of the new
didactic world as a centerpiece. The figure of the prophet is
that of discoverer and seer into the future and both
dimensions are well captured in the emblematic portrait of
[Vol. 54842
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Langdell reproduced in the very first issue of The Green
Bag from 1860. (See figure 3.)
Figure 3. Christopher Columbus Langdell.
Beards may have been the fashion back then, but
Christopher Columbus Langdell is pictured adorned with a
luxuriance of facial hair that quite exceeds the norm. He is
what the glossators termed a langobard, or long beard, with
genuine chin hair that reaches down toward his belly and
out of the frame of the picture. It is also somewhat wild,
though scientifically bifurcated, left and right, as it
progresses down. To this we can add the spectacles of the
seer, and hair that is wavy and covers the ears. It is in the
nature of the prophetic figure to escape both time and
institution. He is originary, emblematic, and while of the
world also in excess of the living. Thus Langdell appears
2006] 843
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both prophetic and parental, academic and poetic, human
but unworldly. The portrait in this regard is unmarked by
the usual insignia of office or function. The founder is
formidable by virtue, amongst other things, of the absence
of any of the usual markers of attachment: he appears as a
scientist, a thinker, as legal scientific dasein pure and
simple.
In legal terms, the prophetic belongs within the genre
of the immemorial, of time beyond memory, beyond the
conusance of mortals and certainly in excess of students'
epistemic capabilities. Visually statuesque, the photo
portrait of Langdell is so realistic and expressionlessly
intense in content that it manages to portray the paradox of
a scientist prophet and the irony of a founder who came
after the foundation. Langdell was indeed in that sense a
revolutionary rather than an originator, hence the
phenomenological term originary fits as depicting a living
principle of propagation that is sufficiently indefinite as not
to be reduced to any one moment or mood. The
megalograph should in this sense escape definition.
Cardozo School of Law, incidentally, has no obviously
prophetic painting of foundation-the portrait of the
founding dean belongs within several different categories
and has an ambivalent status as well as a distinct absence
of artistic quality. What there is, however, is a photo
portrait of Benjamin N. Cardozo, the patron figure, and
eponymous hero of the School. The photo is framed close to
the portraits of the School's former deans but is not hung
with them. Interestingly, it comes after the decanal
portraits and closer to the inner sanctum-the current
dean's office-than the portraits that face the elevator and
greet each student who nervously makes her way either to
the administrative offices or toward the registry and office
of financial aid that take up the bulk of the dean's floor. So
perhaps Cardozo, the prophetic figure, the bearer of the
name that he now posthumously shares with the School, is
viewed as being closer to the dean than the former deans.
Maybe he is more important as a guiding figure to current
authors of the law school chapter than he is emblematic of
what our students could hope to become.
In its local context, the photo portrait of Cardozo carries
certain of the insignia of prophecy, and of the immemorial
as well. Dressed in a suit, without background or prop,
Benjamin looks with a slant at the camera. Hair white with
844 [Vol. 54
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age, face tilted slightly downward,16  Cardozo looks
forbiddingly intent, concentrated and piercing. To this, the
reason for invoking the photograph, must be added one of
the most interesting of tropes of legal portraiture: the hand.
The photo portrait shows Cardozo resting his right hand,
index finger slightly unfurled, on the table in front of him.
This gesture returns, in the common law tradition, at least
to Van Dyke's portrait of Sir Edward Coke. The left hand is
hidden, the right hand visible with an unfurled index finger
and preternaturally elongated as if to indicate a hand that
writes the law. Sir William Blackstone is also famously
portrayed, in a painting attributed to Reynolds, as a fat
man with a miniscule hand holding a small book, as if the
book represents the product or progeny of the hand. The
hand having written, has shrunk and only the book
remains. In both cases, the figure of the hand of the law,
this subtle visual synecdoche of legislation, marks the
disjunction between nature and legality, the person and the
hand of the law.
Back to the photo portrait of Cardozo. It depicts the
judge in a pose that has lengthy legal provenance and
implies a founding significance. His hand, the hand of the
law, is open in the manner of one who writes the law, who
establishes the tradition, and indelibly marks the juristic
habitus to which the student onlooker aspires-witting or
unwittingly-to belong. Contrary to Carlo Ginzburg's
theory that the hands are an overlooked item in paintings
and hence a good clue to authenticity, the hand of the
lawyer is of indubitable conscious significance; the
Morellian method doesn't work with legal portraits. 17 As
Seneca puts it, "0 digitum multum significatemP' a
sentiment that gave birth to a long tradition of corporeal
eloquence or common law chirologia.18 Coke and Cardozo,
16. We should note that traditionally judges should judge with downcast
eyes, or in more modern terminology, they should render justice as if they were
wearing a blindfold. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE
(Chichester Fortescue trans., Garland Publishing 1980) (1869).
17. See CARLO GINZBURG, MYTHS, EMBLEMS, CLUES 96-97 (John and Anne C.
Tedeschi trans., 1990).
18. Meaning the finger is full of significance. See, e.g., GILBERT AUSTIN,
CHIRONOMIA; OR A TREATISE ON RHETORICAL DELIVERY (W. Bulmer & Co., 1806);
JOHN BULWER, CHIROLOGIA: OR THE NATVRALL LANGVAGE OF THE HAND (Tho.
Harper 1644).
2006] 845
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the former slightly more boldly than the latter, are
portrayed with their index finger pointing forward. In
chirology this constitutes Gestus VI, Indico, which Bulwer
defines as indicating direction or command. That Coke's
thumb is unfurled further denotes that he shows both sides
of an issue; he both commends and corrects, while Cardozo
is more rhetorically inclined. That Cardozo's hand is in the
main open, means there is a reference to the persuasion or
openness of rhetoric, and by implication less of a visual
reference to the closed fist or force of logic.
The portrait of Professor Monrad Gotke Paulsen,
founding dean of Cardozo School of Law, the heir of the
dogma, is also mildly prophetic in tenor. (See figure 4.) He
is bespectacled, white haired, and seated with a law book,
encased in red, on a table before him. There are various
striking features to this amicable and avuncular
representation. First note the posture. He is seated well
back, loin thrust forward at the level of what seems to be a
coffee table in front of him. He is at ease, in power, almost
too relaxed. Add to this his left hand hidden below the table
while the right hand, much larger than life, grasps the
chair and is seen both directly and reflected in the glass of
the coffee table. No Reynolds the portraitist responsible for
this picture, but let that pass. The right hand, larger or
smaller than the real, according to the dictates of fashion in
portraiture, is symptomatic of a slide from mundane
representation to instantiation of tradition. It is in the end
not the person but the life and character that the portrait is
to represent. In this perspective, the hand is a key marker
of law, a sign of potentia or power, a liminal site and hence
a perfect point at which to slip from the real to the
imaginary relation to legality. Paulsen's hand, his role as
the law, is clearly large, even doubled, if only locally. More
than that, there is red paint on the right hand, as if the red
of the law text in front of the dean has rubbed off on him, orjust as possibly he on it, offering blood as lineage, as nomos
and law. He now is literally the bearer of the text of a law
that got onto the skin if not visibly under it. That or he is
bleeding.
That the hand is spread in so expansive a gesture of
accommodation, seizing hold of the corner of the chair,
combines a number of chirologic significations. The hand
spread down is a gesture of friendship and indicative of the
habit of bounty. In the classical treatises it connotes
846 [Vol. 54
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liberality. That the hand is extended also marks a tentative
gesture of aid-auxilium fero-which clearly befits a
pedagogic as well as a founding function. One might note
also, by contrast to Coke and Cardozo, Paulsen is not
figured making any gesture to either rhetoric or writing, his
liberality is as educator rather than author and this is
marked, intentionally or otherwise, by the fact that framed
next to Cardozo, but attributed to Paulsen, is a page of
finely calligraphed quotation from the valedictory speech
that Paulsen made upon stepping down as the dean of
University of Virginia Law School. The quotation is not
from what the dean emeritus said, but is a passage from an
eighteenth century schoolmaster Paulsen quoted. In other
words, his generosity lay in passing things on, rather than
in composition.
Figure 4. Monrad Gotke Paulsen.
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B. Delegatus Maiestatis
The figure of the prophet historically combined both the
oracular prediction of what was to come and the terror that
accompanies the anticipation of divine wrath. The figure of
the founder is thus an awesome one, larger than life and
excluded from life in the same sense that the divine author
of the laws must take up an invisible space of the
immemorial or, to borrow from the theologians, an
antiquity older than time.19 Prophesy is precisely aligned
with a temporality both prior to and beyond the inhabited
present. The prophet represents the oracular speech of the
divine as a messenger of future portents, as a hermeneut,
but not as a legislator. Prophesy, in other words, and with
all due deference to Justice Holmes, is more of a theological
function than a procedure of secular law. It deals with the
law of law, it offers an iconic yet unmatchable face for the
edification of the contemporary denizens of the institution.
The prophet lours over the living, not simply as a cloud but
as a condensation of an ultimately unknowable source of
law. Their prophesies await realization or refutation in the
hands of the living.
It is not the prophet, but rather the sovereign and
delegates of the sovereign, the judges who put the
unknowable, or at least foreign, languages of law into
application. The judge is delegatus maiestatis-the delegate
of the author of the laws. He is viva vox iuris, lex loquens, or
some other variation on the theme of accession to the
ineffably immutable. The judge speaks in the name of the
father. He gets as close as any putatively secular figure can
get to the arcana or mysteries of an invisible and atemporal
law. There is proximity to greatness. The judicial role is
thus one that the law student should certainly aspire to and
it finds a plenitude of references in decanal portraiture.
There are some deans who become judges, such as
Calabresi at Yale, but he became one after being dean and
his portrait is suitably injudicious. Almost pastoral, with a
painting of a horse in the top corner of the frame and a
portrait of a woman, presumably his wife, interestingly
located underneath the sculpture of a cherub. It would take
19. JOHN FAVOUR, ANTIQUITIE TRIUMPHING OVER NOVELTIE (London: Ricard
Field, 1619).
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years of analysis to work through everything implied by
such positioning and I will not even try, at least not here.
There are, however, some little hints of sovereignty even in
the portrait of Calabresi. The chair, for example, is more a
throne than a stool, with an ornate leaf carved, right and
left, atop the back. It marks his office, just as surely as the
veritas on the professorially endowed chairs at Harvard
guarantees the sovereignty of their words.
At Cardozo it is Cardozo, Benjamin I mean, who lours
prophetically and without any signs of office or sovereign
function. That said, it is known beyond refutation that he is
a judge-one of the most famous-and students are given
copies of his book, The Nature of Law, when they first visit
the Law School. I noted that his outstretched index finger
suggested composition and beside him a passage of
educational lore that Dean Paulsen framed for the benefit
of his heirs. The judicial lawmaking role is depicted
pictorially by emblems of office, as well as by posture and
setting. Thus the weighty, red bound law text that sits in
front of Paulsen connotes a proximity to text and textual
system. So too, the glass table that mirrors both the legist
and the law, helps imply by visual trope an incorporation of
the law according to the oldest of juristic maxims, omnia
scrinia habet in pectore sua, he carries the law in his breast,
or in this instance, in manu sua, on his hand.
Legal portraiture is full of the marks of sovereignty and
office. In early paintings, it was the rod of legal office that
marked the delegated majesty of the judge as embodiment
of the law. Francis Bacon, as an example, is painted
standing, a blank piece of paper in his left hand, a cane or
rod of office in his right.20 Such insignia of the delegation of
maiestas were common and filter into more modern
portraiture in the form of law books, judicial robes, canes or
other markers of lawmaking ability or power. Thus the
portrait of Christopher Columbus Langdell that hangs in
the Harvard Law School Library-Langdell Library, in
Langdell Hall-depicts the bearded Dean with his hands on
blank papers, law books stacked on his desk and a cane
20. SIR D. PLUNKETT BARTON ET AL., THE STORY OF OUR INNS OF COURT (G. T.
Foulis & Co. 1924). The text reproduces the painting without attribution in the
course of a chapter that treats Bacon as of sufficient stature to be if not an Inn
of Court himself, at least a staple and support of the Inns. Id.
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lying over it. Each visual figure, each sign, is significant
and known to the law.
The blank paper that is common to the portraits of
Bacon and Langdell is a marker of the space of inscription,
of the laws that will be written.21 It is a popular visual
trope in Jacobin and subsequent portraiture and indicates
both the power of writing and the space-the tabula rasa of
the future-that will be mapped or subjugated by law. Thus
one of the most famous portraits of Elizabeth 1st depicts her
standing beside an open book, pages blank, awaiting her
sovereignty, her rule. The blank page is terra incognita, or
undiscovered land; it is free of images, ready for the reason
and presence of prose. The blank page signifies potentia in
its technical sense, representing both power and possibility,
the presence of what Latinity called a potentate, the
biopolitical embodiment of authority and power. The dean
who has blank papers in front of him is clearly a legislator,
a tongue or, better, a pen of the law. Maybe not quite Deo
auctore, but certainly lex scripta. Take the example of
Marion Rice Kirkwood, dean of Stanford Law School from
1924 to 1930, who is painted seated with his right hand on
a volume of law reports and his fingers inside the pages.
One could hardly depict someone in greater intimacy and
proximity to law than that.
Cardozo offers no obvious images of decanal potency but
does have one aesthetically remarkable portrait of a dean
breaking out of his portrait, uncontainable, exuberant. The
second founder of Cardozo, its symbolic sovereign, was
Dean Monroe Price, M.P. for short, M.P. the second. (See
figure 5.) It was Monroe Price who raised the value of the
School and oversaw the introduction of a global group of
scholars, from Derrida to Luhmann, Schlink to Salecl, into
the academic community. If his tenure as dean were to be
captured pictorially, his portrait would need to be a
different kind of megalograph. And it is. Professor Price is
portrayed in an angular and plastic mode. His face, adorned
by surreally large, cubist spectacles, not only stares out but
also actually comes out of the frame. Here is a potentate
who seemingly might actually bite. A three dimensional
framed portrait is certainly not the norm in painting, or in
21. See Peter Goodrich, The Iconography of Nothing, in LAW AND THE IMAGE,
supra note 9, at 89, 89-114.
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law schools. It constitutes a demi-bust, a plastic mask, an
imago in the oldest of senses. Here the megalograph is
sufficiently explicit, and the high price of the dean, the
megaprice as it were, institutes a representation that
literally adds a dimension to the usual aesthetic norms of
decanal portraiture. Price, in other words, belongs in the
atrium; he is the ur-ancestor of Cardozo, the Langdell of
global legal scholarship, a lawyer, an aesthete, a maverick.
Figure 5. Monroe Price.
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The portrait of Price the potentate is both unusual and
instructive. It is a face made from a cast, although it is not
a mold of the face. It thus draws upon the tradition of the
imago of the ancestor but inverts it through the ironic
device of providing a mask of something other than the
actual face, here the image being cast from photographs
rather than the person. The act of making a cast from
pictorial figures of the living subject distances the mask a
second time from the subject represented, it makes it in
essence a mask of a mask of the face, and so institutes a
distance that allows for an explicit hermeneutics, a
negotiation as to the meaning and the price. At the same
time, and however arrived at, the portrait also offers a
glimpse of an unconventional aesthetic for a lawyer. Drawn
to interdisciplinary scholarship and to international
programs, and so to the exterior of national law and its
jurisdiction, Price is represented in a suitably mixed
aesthetic form, part icon, part idol, part portrait, and part
bust or even busted.
C. The Pedant
The delegated sovereign maintains the function of the
father and furthers the parental role of the juridical. The
portrait of the dean as sovereign has to capture a duality
that mediates the anterior and awful power of sovereignty
with its tellurian translation. 22 The fact of delegation thus
institutes a presence that harbors and represents, but does
not generally inhabit, except in image, an exterior and
higher cause. The dean is a secular, as opposed to
prophetic, representative of divine, or at least extra-human
law. What is distinctive about delegated sovereigns is they
are vicariously glorious, or in the Lacanian idiom, they
speak in the name of the father for the benefit of the
student or son. The delegate is thus a medium, a harbinger
and translator of a law dictated to them by a superior power
that momentarily inhabits them. The pedant constitutes
the next stage of secularization or of progression down the
hierarchy.
22. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 142-43 (2006) (noting, and wanly predicting
the future prevalence of male subjects of portraiture, in the tradition of
megalographs in a Yale Law School classroom).
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The word pedant has a lengthy history. Classically, it
simply meant schoolteacher and sometimes it meant
Latinist. Originally spelled paedant, it shares etymological
roots with paedagogus, meaning a slave who attended
children, particularly at school. The pedant was a tutor of
youth, a teacher, the ruler of the schola who would pass on
the inherently beneficial rules contained in the juridical
library. The Dean as pedant is perhaps one of the most
common of depictions, marked by props such as academic
hat and gown, a scroll in hand or bookshelves in the
background. The pedant is signified as unthreatening and
their pedantry or wisdom is generally passively portrayed
by the above or other insignia, not only of law but of
scholarship, and the essentially contemplative tradition
that it represents. While the prophet and the delegated
sovereign are iconic, they represent, without being
touchable or capable of being emulated, by dint of their
distance, their terror or their eccentricity. While the
paternal function is wholly aspirational, the pedant is
essentially an avuncular figure of transmission.
The central function of the law school is to teach. It also
trains and provides a practical vocation, but scholarship
and pedagogy are the primary pursuits of the legal academy
and the principal means of professional induction. The
great schools may seek to model sovereign or judicial status
as the role to which the student should aspire, and later
live up to, but for the bulk of students the school is a
nursery that inculcates the ethos, the habits and practices
of calculating like a lawyer. Here the key is the dialectic of
teacher and student, what the Latins term that of doctrina
and disciplina-dogma and learning. This is the stuff of the
literature of 'preparatives' and other introductions to legal
study and it details the melancholy rules of a sedentary
and, some might say, sad profession. Here it is the
knowledge of things divine and human that is taught, the
spiritual training in things tellurian-the leges terrae-is
passed on from parent to child, from pedagogue to pupil,
through the schola, the mini-empire of the pedant.
The placement of portraits of decanal pedants is often
in the classroom. Thus at Harvard there are numerous
deans who overlook both the hallways into the lecture
theaters and seminar rooms and who gaze down
benevolently, if intently, upon the serried array of desks.
Dean Vorenberg in room 321 of Langdell is an example.
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Secular in his pin-striped suit and not too old-in the
portrait at least-he smiles along while behind his right
hand, blurred yet visible, are bookshelves with their
contents, the insignia of the academic in his scholarly
habitus. The message is clearly that here we learn and the
dean will help you to learn or will orchestrate the
environment to facilitate the ingestion of an essentially
secular and autonomous knowledge.
The various types of the pedagogue are visible
everywhere. The shift from delegated majesty to the
accessible, if formal, figure of the pedant increasingly
occurs as the twentieth century progresses. Long before
Cardozo was born, the law school that is, the less and less
remembered Judge Professor Albert Sachs was portrayed
dressed in an off-white suit for his portrait, as if he were an
explorer perhaps as much as a professor. Dean Pound is
portrayed from behind, wearing the visor of the telegraph
clerk as if he were a semiotician as much as a law professor,
which is probably true, and Robert Clark, until recently the
dean of Harvard, is all accessibility leaning on a library
bookcase in a modern suit and tie.
Enough about Harvard, it is simply an example, it
happens to be there, and it is so much older than Cardozo
School of Law, its modern inheritor, alphabetical and so
lexical superior. There has been little time at Cardozo to
build a catalogue of the subdivisions of decanal pedant but
my friend Dean Macchiarola (amicus mea-he wanted to
recruit me) certainly provides an instance of a curious kind.
(See figure 6.) He is portrayed, slightly larger than life,
with a fulsome realism, in his decanal office. The walls are
wood paneled, which might lead one to think that he was in
a judicial office, possibly in court or moot court, but in fact
it is simply the unremodelled tenth floor room that is used
by the dean. One has to remark also, however, of the
painting that there are no indicia of scholarship, no books
or papers, and hence the curious purity of his pedantic or
pastoral role.
Dean Macchiarola is depicted in a blue shirt with a
dark tie and pants. He is awfully casual in his way but his
arms are folded across his chest and his hands hidden. The
posture of folded arms and hidden hands somewhat defies
chirological classification. What can be said is that it
suggests intensity and that it implies both concentration-a
full, if not fully frontal attention-and an undisclosed
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wealth of knowledge. That kind of fits the man whose aura,
in the portrait at least, is shimmering and golden. His is
the figure of a dean given over to teaching and pastoral
care. So much so that his arms don't stretch out, he makes
no gesture or rhetorical figure of either reading or writing.
He will listen, he is all face and, because he is portrayed in
profile, he is literally all ear. Thus there are no hands
visible, no unfurled finger signifying writing, no open palm
of eloquent delivery, just the full if sidelong expression, the
speculum pastoralis, or gaze of pastoral care and concern.
Figure 6. Frank Macchiarola.
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The pedant exists in a paradoxical relation to the pupil.
He, or she, is the slave of her youthful subjects and the
servant of knowledge, yet at the same time she is powerful
and an object of transference as well as of an often covert
reverence. The student wants to like and be like the
teacher. She wishes to desire what the teacher knows and
one avenue for such desire is through the person of the
teacher, through the living embodiment of the knowledge
that she wants. Perhaps the folded arms can be understood
as expressing that paradox and its attendant counter-
transference. The hands are hidden because the student
must not be touched, because the pedagogue serves a
greater love and a higher desire. He is both master and
servant, sovereign and slave, or perhaps simply divine and
human, rolled into one. That at least seems to be the color
of the portrait, its impressionistic backdrop, its shimmering
aura, as well as the more direct connotation of hidden
hands and a sideways look.
D. The Ghost
Cardozo School of Law is a young school and with the
exception of Dean Monrad Gotke Paulsen, who died in his
Chair, all of the deans portrayed are still living. The
decanal portraits are also confined to the tenth floor,
hidden, as it were, in the attic, in the administrative site of
the building. They have not yet spread to the library,
student common areas, the teaching rooms, or following
Dean Rostow's theorem, spaces close to the bathrooms. That
is unusual in the sense that the exemplars or models of
institutional being are usually immediately visible. Enter
Langdell Hall at Harvard and you are immediately
confronted by Joseph Story in the foyer to the library, then
a host of further emblems and busts of deans and jurists.
The library itself, and the other common areas, are all
pleasingly, and at times forbiddingly, overlooked by antique
and more modern portraits. So too at the other end of the
scales of status, Cleveland Marshall College of Law has the
bust of John Marshall in the lobby of the law school. Right
when you walk in, formidable, severe, and then duplicated
in the form of a single portrait that hangs at the center of
the moot court room, the school's centerpiece, overlooking
the bench where the judges and future judges will sit. At
University College London, you cannot get into the law
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library without passing the formidable figure of the auto-
icon, the stuffed Jeremy Bentham.
The dead are more numerous than the living and so it
makes sense that in any but a young law school, the
portraits of the deceased and departed will greatly
outnumber those that depict the living. The academy is
ruled visually by ghosts, by the masks of those who have
passed on and left behind the tradition or the emblems of
character and lore that those who follow must take up. For
the Romans it was the imago, the literal death mask of the
ancestor that would lour down, taking precedence over the
mere flesh of the living. For modern lawyers, the law
remains comparably old, it is still tradition preserved in an
esoteric or inkhorn tongue. Even if the modes of its
preservation are changing, law is still much imbued with
death.23 The ghostly function of law, its spiritual source,
cause and purpose gain muted expression in some of the
portraits. The dead overlook the living and yet are
themselves overlooked. In ancient common law, that
function of overseeing the souls of the subjects of law was
explicit, the law was a nursing parent, it was the speculum
of the pastoral, it looked into the soul. Today, the
unremarked and generally unnoticed character of decanal
portraits suggests that they operate unconsciously or upon
the modern equivalent of the soul, the somatic body, upon
dreams and other sleeping forms.
There are various inexplicit and express visual indicia
of death, or at least of the passage of significant periods of
time, in many of the decanal portraits. The dress, the style
of hair and facial luxuriance, the markers of office, such as
rods and robes, all signify dogma or the decorum and
unspoken vastness of the tradition. I will use just two final
local examples. The portrait of Monrad Gotke Paulsen has a
curious white halo. It is hard to see in a digital
reproduction, but reflectography would clearly indicate that
the painting has been touched up or painted over with a
vemeer of white. It gives the impression of an aura of
whiteness, a spectrality or ghostliness that suggests the
heavily sedentary Dean is both of this world and the next.
In Christian terms, one might say that the halo effect takes
23. See Peter Goodrich, Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies,
and the Politics of Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 2033 (2001).
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up, in a lesser way, the theme of the impossible unity of
Christ. Both flesh and spirit, here and elsewhere, seated
and ascendant, Paulsen fades into whiteness. There is
almost a halo around his head. It may be a smudge in the
color, but there is a discoloration, a fading or incipient
marking over his head, white hair evaporating perhaps into
the ether. I would have thought nothing more of it were it
not that I encountered it elsewhere, and most noticeably at
Harvard Law School where the portrait of the felicitous
Justice Frankfurter is swathed in whiteness as if the great
judge were, even while sitting for his portrait, communing
with the past-the immemorial, the divinity, the gods.
According to the critic Georges Didi-Huberman, the
most powerful images, and by the same token the images
most given to transmitting power, are those that conceal
the hand of the artist.24 They are technically termed
acheiropoeitic images, handless creations, representations
that are untouched by merely mortal distractions and
desires. The exemplar of the acheiropoietic image is the
Veronique or Turin shroud, the mask of Christ imprinted
mystically upon cloth. Here nature as nomos imposes itself
directly, without the interference or detraction that even
hermeneutics is prone to bring. There is nothing especially
acheiropoietic about the portrait of Paulsen, it is all too
human, even taking account of the halo effect or the
spectral aura. The portrait of the most recently retired dean
of Cardozo School of Law, Paul Verkuil, however, mimics
the acheiropoietic form by representing the face of the dean
as a specter imprinted upon a white canvas whose
extremities remain white and untouched. (See figure 7.)
The portrait of Verkuil stands out for being just a face
and not much more; no torso, no hands, no props or limbs,
gowns or robes, of any kind, just the seemingly
instantaneous imprint or imago of the face supported by a
white collar and red tie. It is a portrait that in Didi-
Huberman's terms directly represents the ddchirure, the
rent, fissure, or tearing of the image from the life. That the
portrait seems torn or seized from some greater whole
accurately depicts the function of the image as something
more than the living, as something cast from the soul. That
it seems unfinished, interrupted, stolen or rent also
24. GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, DEVANT L'IMAGE (1990).
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pleasingly aligns the rending of the image with the
rendering of justice. Both the decanal portrait and the
judicial determination should be given without any
divagation or interference from the hands of those in whom
the custody of tradition and transmission are alike
entrusted. In other words, the perfect portrait of the dean is
one which simply shows the dean, that captures the face so
well, that depicts imago or character so precisely, that the
hand of the artist is invisible. It should appear as if the face
were taken and printed upon the canvas by means of a
divine exhalation of color. It is the same fiction of pure
representation that underpins the notion of the judge
finding and declaring the law without adding even a comma
of his own. Image and judgment, in this theory, are alike
rendered rather than composed. They are hyperreal rather
than merely artistic, they are imprints of the immemorial,
of the cause of causes or law of laws, rather than being
merely secular human interventions.
Figure 7. Paul Verkuil.
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CONCLUSION: SYMBOLIC SPACES
By and large we don't see ghosts and yet the lawyer
inhabits a territory that is full of specters and other relics of
the long dead. It was Maitland who said that despite their
demise, the forms of action rule us from the grave. In a
similar spirit, one could say that the images of past deans
legislate the proper forms of character from beyond the
frames in which they are housed. Inanimate, often tawdry
and drably executed, the portraiture of deans overlooks and
dictates to the unconscious eye or to the oneiric subject that
is formed in the course of the study of law. The academy
academicizes, it imprints, it formulates and forms the
character of its students, it operates a symbolic
permutation in which the pupil enters and learns to inhabit
the space of law. The fact that we no longer know how to
look, that most students if asked what they think of the
portraits in the Law School would respond "what portraits?"
simply adds to the invisible power or ghostly significance
and function of these emblematically overlooked icons of
personal propriety.
I have refrained from judging the portraits discussed.
That is only in part because I am a nice guy; it is more that
it is the detail and the function, the didactic role that is
significant rather than the foibles of production. Good or
bad, it does not matter that much, the portraits play their
role, or in Bentham's case the auto icon offers an exemplary
position or image of a life. In one sense portraiture belongs
to an age that has passed and a mode of representation that
is now dated, surpassed perhaps by a digital efflorescence of
means of representation. They are fictions or, to adapt a
maxim, in pictura iuris semper est aequitas, these are
images of justice that model justly. They show not the
person but the life, not the likeness but the character, not
the face but the law. That at least is the theory of the
megalograph or portrait of the forebears and of the great.
That we no longer consciously recognize these images
simply means that it is necessary, as Lacan formulated it,
to put our ignorance to work or, more positively, to work
upon our ignorance.
Returning to the roots of the modern juristic tradition,
in a treatise on portraiture published in 1659, the author
Charles Sorel addresses both the laws and the passion of
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portraiture. Borrowing from a tradition that goes back to
Pliny, the passion that motivated portraiture was the desire
of the lover for an image of the beloved.25 Within this
tradition of amorous portraiture-what portrait is not in
some sense enamored or of an inamorata-the laws of the
discipline dictated accuracy in the representation of the
spirit of the subject. Sorel cites a number of quite amusing
cases in which bad portraits were hauled up before the
magistrature of the City of Portraits and subjected to trial.
If found guilty, the portraits themselves, the 'patiens,' were
taken to a public place and hung there for a while "so as to
shame those who had painted them," and then later
removed and burned, their ashes thrown to the winds. Sorel
comments upon this in the following terms: "It is a good
policy on the part of the police not to allow such portraits to
remain in the world for fear that they would pervert the
spirits" and for that reason not only were the effigies
burned, but the artists had to do public penance and watch
as their works were consumed by the fires of aesthetic hell.
Sorel's stories of the condemnation of immoral portraits
borrow from older Roman traditions where effigies would be
burned and memory condemned. I cannot resurrect that
history here but it does help to remind us that the visual
representation of the institution's past, of the tradition and
places, of the names and personae from which the law
descends have a long history and a likely significance that
exceeds the portrait's representation of the likeness. The
megalograph bears the burden of the symbolic and, together
with the architecture and other juridical insignia of law
schools, marks the difference, or renders the rite that
defines the space of legality. Portraits solemnize and
ritualize the roles that the legal subject will take up. Law
school is their introduction and, witting or unwitting, the
portraits of deans take their place within a tradition of
moral painting which, at its best, to cite Sorel again, paints
"the qualities of the soul and the conditions of persons."26 It
is a primary site of tutelage, such that one might conclude:
without pictures, how would we learn?
25. CHARLES SOREL, LA DESCRIPTION DE L'ISLE DE PORTRAITURE ET DE LA
VILLE DES PORTRAITS (Paris: Charles de Sercy 1659).
26. Id. at 78.
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